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Compulsory Interventions Are 
Challenging the Identity of Psychiatry
Paul Hoff *
Department of Psychiatry, Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, University Hospital of Psychiatry Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
Compulsory interventions severely restrict constitutional rights of the patients. They are 
exceptional measures only to be considered under strict and clearly defined ethical and 
juridical conditions. They do confront mental health professionals with difficult questions 
challenging their individual professional identity as well as the identity of psychiatry in 
general. This complex field is discussed in reference to the conceptual history of 
psychiatry, to different contemporary approaches to the notion of autonomy, and to three 
ethically demanding issues: autonomy and care, psychiatry and society, personhood and 
interpersonal relations. Engaging open mindedly in these debates may be cumbersome 
for psychiatry, but will yield a substantial return, particularly regarding its identity and 
acceptance by society.
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INTRODUCTION
The issue of compulsory interventions in psychiatry is usually regarded as a mainly ethical and 
practical topic. However, this paper will link it with the fundamental question of psychiatry’s 
identity as a medical field in clinical and scientific contexts. In recent years—albeit, of course, not 
for the first time in the history of psychiatry—this conceptual area generated intense debate and 
controversy. Two different epistemological levels are distinctively intertwined: the theoretical level 
reflecting upon the “object” of psychiatric work in therapeutic or research activities on the one hand, 
and the practical level focusing on how psychiatric services can be optimally organized within the 
competing demands of being effective, adequate, and economically justifiable1 on the other hand. 
Both will now be briefly illustrated as for their conjunction with compulsory interventions.
Psychiatry’s self-understanding is challenged on the theoretical level when trying to define the 
proper “object” the field is dealing with: Is it the individual person (biographical and hermeneutic 
approaches), the person’s bodily existence, especially his or her central nervous system (neuroscientific 
approaches), or the person’s environment, ranging from close relationships to society as a whole?
On the practical level, the last decades brought about a remarkable paradigm shift from strong, 
if, of course, benevolent paternalistic attitudes to an explicit emphasis on patient autonomy and 
informed consent, both in clinical work and in research. Such a strong and, at times, poorly reflected 
notion of autonomy has been questioned repeatedly by indicating potentially negative consequences 
of “overvaluing autonomous decision making” (1, 2). In this context, the issue of “open psychiatry” 
is to be mentioned. At present, there is a broad consensus that the plain postulate to “open the 
wards” cannot be sufficient, unless it takes specific local conditions (including regulatory ones) into 
1In Switzerland, exactly these mandatory prerequisites of any medical intervention that has to be paid for by basic insurance 
are explicitly mentioned in the federal law on health insurance (“Krankenversicherungsgesetz,” KVG). Since this law came 
into effect in 1994, the “WZW-criteria” (for the German terms “Wirksamkeit, Zweckmaessigkeit, Wirtschaftlichkeit”) gained 
considerable influence on health policy and on the conceptualization of health services also in psychiatry and psychotherapy.
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account. Furthermore, the United Nations’ “Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities” (3) prominently represents 
the new paradigm: Not the handicapped person has to prove his 
or her ability to be reintegrated into society, but—the other way 
round—it is society’s responsibility to argue why any person, 
with or without handicap, should not be its unquestioned, in a 
way “normal” part2.
This demonstrates that any psychiatric work implicates 
epistemological, ethical, and anthropological (to sum up: 
philosophical) questions. Psychiatry has to face them, especially 
when tackling conflictuous topics like compulsory interventions. 
This, however, does not mean that philosophical considerations 
should be given too much weight to the disadvantage of practical 
issues in psychiatric services. On the contrary, if, at this point, 
listening to Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) who thoroughly knew both 
worlds, the psychiatric and the philosophical one (4), one might 
be surprised to come across a decisively cautious, if not critical 
perspective:
“The reason why the psychopathologist should care 
about philosophy is not that it will teach him anything 
positive for his own scientific field, but that it will provide 
him with the inner space to realize what knowledge he 
can possibly acquire.” (5, p.40) [translated by P.H.].
In other words, philosophical reflection itself may well be seen 
as necessary but not as sufficient precondition for good clinical 
practice in psychiatry, including the issue of responsibly handling 
compulsory interventions.
Before turning to three fields of tension that are practically 
relevant and wield major influence over the identity of psychiatry, 
the concept of autonomy, central to modern medical ethics, shall 
be highlighted (6).
THe CONCePT OF AUTONOMY 
IN PsYCHIATRY: esseNTIAL AND 
CUMBeRsOMe
The understanding of persons with a mental disorder as patients, 
as suffering individuals entitled to be taken seriously and treated 
efficiently, is, from a historical point of view, a comparably 
young concept—as is psychiatry itself: Both emerged in the 
era of enlightenment in the eighteenth century with its strong 
emphasis on rationality and personhood, that is, the notion 
of rationality created an optimistic stance over the scientific 
comprehensibility, not to say mastery of our world. The concept 
of personhood postulated that human individuals are not more 
or less passive elements of given social or political structures like 
kingdoms, religions, or nations, but possess a dignity of their own 
which includes autonomous and responsible decision making. 
Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) philosophy is the most prominent 
representative of such an anthropological framework. Pars pro 
toto, the categorical imperative, central to Kantian ethics, shall be 
mentioned because of its close links to the notion of autonomy:
2See footnote 8.
“Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in 
your own person or in the person of any other, never 
merely as a means to an end, but always at the same 
time as an end.” (7).
To see another person only as a means to my own intentions is 
therefore disrespectful, ignores his or her autonomy, and cannot 
be ethically justifiable.
Thus, we may, with good reasons, trace core elements of 
modern psychiatry back to the evolving liberal ideas of the 
eighteenth century and their focus on autonomous persons and 
their indispensable civil rights.
However, one-sidedness must be avoided: As often in the 
history of science, new paradigms brought about progress and 
carried risks. It was exactly this caution that led Max Horkheimer 
(1895–1973) and Theodor W. Adorno (1903–1969), leaders of the 
“Frankfurt School,” to coin the term “dialectics of enlightenment” 
(8, 9): Emancipatory ideas, that are not continuously monitored 
and recalibrated, may be misunderstood or abused, in the worst 
case creating the opposite effect they had intended. Although 
mainly applicable to historical and political domains, this 
argument is also of value for psychiatry: The concept of personal 
autonomy, adopted from the discourse of enlightenment in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, by no means 
guaranteed the reduction or abolishment of compulsory 
measures or inhumane treatments of mentally ill people.
Another plea is raised against linking psychiatry with the 
liberal, person-oriented mainstream of enlightenment: Can 
this position ever gain credibility when psychiatry’s active 
support of the grossly inhumane, better, perverted, and 
pseudoscientific activities of medicine in the Nazi era is taken 
into account (10, 11)?
It has a lot to do with this dialectics of science that 
postmodern philosophy stayed profoundly skeptical towards 
“grand theories” in general and the notion of an autonomous 
subject as anthropological hallmark in particular. This again had 
instant consequences for the autonomy debate in medical ethics: 
In the last decades, concepts with strong, some say metaphysical 
presuppositions like in Kant’s deontological ethics were criticized 
as narrowing down normative issues to the western (Christian 
and liberal) tradition.
In the second half of the twentieth century and up to now, 
among others, two radically different alternatives were developed.
The first one defined autonomy (in the sense of free personal 
decision making) as the very center of what is called conditio 
humana. For existentialist philosophers, the most prominent one 
in this context being Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980), humans do 
not only possess the ability or the option to act autonomously, 
but also must decide for themselves; they are, in a way, forced 
to use their freedom. This, nota bene, is a formal argument. It 
does not address the issue of what the individual person choses 
or whether his or her choice is wise or silly, good or bad. It also 
is a radically individualistic approach: Any person decides, must 
decide for himself or herself without having to refer to a given 
normative framework.
The second approach denies the purely individualistic 
nature of autonomy, which, on the contrary, is defined as 
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essentially interpersonal. In this view, autonomy is neither 
depending on metaphysical principles nor on radical individual 
freedom but develops and, in a way, exists only when persons 
communicate with each other on the basis of mutual acceptance 
and respect. An existentialistic author, Emmanuel Levinas 
(1906–1995), tried to bridge both ways of thinking about 
autonomy by introducing an insurmountable gap between 
“me” and “the other,” the latter understood as an existentially 
necessary element, that is radically different and not fully 
comprehensible to me. Therefore, Levinas’ ethics must not be 
mistaken as a dialogical approach like the one that, in contrast, 
gave distinction to Martin Buber’s (1878–1965) or Harry Stack 
Sullivan’s (1892–1949) work (12, 13) (see section "Personhood 
and Interpersonal Relations").
In recent years, “grand theory-oriented” approaches like 
Kantian or existentialist concepts have significantly lost influence, 
especially in medical ethics. Many present-day authors do accept 
personal autonomy as an essential attribute of human beings, 
an attribute, however, that exerts its full strength only when 
positioned in a communicative social context: Autonomy is not 
perceived as a preexisting or metaphysical idea, but originates 
within social relationships, e.g., in medical care. This basic 
assumption is the common denominator of broadly discussed 
concepts like “relational autonomy,” “ethics of care,” or “narrative 
ethics” (14–18).
This demonstrates the complexity and diversity of the 
present philosophical debate on autonomy. There seems to be, 
however, a minimal consensus between most of the competing 
approaches when it comes to medical ethics: Whatever the 
philosophical underpinning may be, ethically sound decision 
making requires respect for the other person’s opinion exactly 
because he or she is a person. Of course, respecting an opinion 
does not mean consenting to it. But without mutual respect, 
patient autonomy cannot be adequately put into practice.
Returning to the field of psychiatry, it can be stated that the 
notion of autonomy—the patient’s as well as the professional’s—
is a core element that interconnects clinical work, psychiatric 
research, and the identity of the field itself (19). Here, identity 
does not refer to a formal philosophical context but addresses the 
self-understanding of people working in (and thus creating) the 
mental health area. Taking the conceptual history of psychiatry 
into account, especially the early referral to the notion of personal 
autonomy in the eighteenth century, compulsory interventions, 
i.e., overriding a person’s wishes and decisions, pose the strongest 
possible contrast—and lead to difficult questions for all people 
involved. Of course, these problems also exist in other medical 
areas, e.g., intensive care or pediatrics. However, in psychiatry, 
the continuous reflection on how psychopathological phenomena 
may restrict the patient’s ability to make full use of his or her 
autonomy is present beyond special situations like the emergency 
room or decisions in a palliative context: It is an indispensable 
element of psychiatric work in general.
Therefore, it is not just an option but a mandatory task 
to encourage the debate on autonomy within psychiatric 
institutions, laboratories, and lecture halls. In the following, 
this postulate will be exemplified in reference to compulsory 
interventions.
COMPULsORY INTeRveNTIONs: FIeLDs 
OF TeNsION, CHALLeNGING THe 
IDeNTITY OF PsYCHIATRY
Compulsory interventions create multiple fields of tension that 
impose considerable pressure on psychiatry’s identity. Three of 
them are to be discussed in some detail here: The ethical dilemma 
of autonomy versus care, the interrelation of psychiatry and 
society, personhood and interpersonal relations as conceptual 
constituents of psychiatry. Of course, these areas are substantially 
intertwined, but they are not synonymous. It is a demanding task 
for any psychiatric activity to address and combine them in a 
reasonable, person-centered manner.
The ethical Dilemma of Autonomy versus 
Care
Two fundamental values in medicine collide in clinical situations 
where compulsory measures are considered: The patient’s autonomy 
on the one hand and his or her entitlement3 to an efficient treatment 
on the other hand. If the decision-making capacity4 is not reduced, 
which is the case in the majority of medical situations, no problem 
arises: The patient’s decision has to be respected, as long as it is 
based upon an informed consent or dissent. Given an informed 
dissent, compulsory measures, as a rule, are not allowed from a 
juridical and not justifiable from an ethical point of view5.
If, however, psychopathological phenomena severely impair 
the patient’s capacity to decide according to his or her intentions 
and preferences, the psychiatrist has to solve the arising ethical 
dilemma by ascribing more weight to one of the above mentioned 
conflicting values. Deciding about the patient’s power of judgement 
based on an exhaustive psychopathological examination is a 
complex and responsible task that psychiatrists are confronted 
with on a daily basis. What is more, to decide on the tenability 
of compulsory interventions regularly includes a prediction of 
possible risks that result from the existing psychopathological 
condition, risks for the patient or for others. Depending on the 
juridical context, the psychiatrist may have to seek permission by 
a court when considering compulsory measures but, in the first 
place, cannot escape the personal decision whether it is justifiable 
or not to force certain procedures upon the patient.
In the present context, dichotomous perspectives—patient and 
psychiatrist—are prevailing. Nonetheless, any therapist will try 
hard to build a therapeutic relationship even under the difficult, 
if not paradoxical, conditions of compulsory interventions. 
This directly alludes to the self-understanding of psychiatric 
professionals and, more general, to the identity of psychiatry. 
The important step from a dichotomous to an interpersonal 
perspective will be addressed later.
3This also has a juridical dimension: If a patient—whether capable of decision 
making or not—is denied necessary medical interventions he or she is entitled to, 
the psychiatrist might be accused of “nonassistance of a person in danger.”
4Also termed “power of judgement” (“Urteilsfaehigkeit” in German, “capacité de 
discernement” in French).
5There are exceptions from this rule: In Switzerland, for example, the lack of the 
power of judgement is not explicitly mentioned as precondition of an involuntary 
admission in case of a mental disorder (20). 
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The Interrelation of Psychiatry and society
Compared to other medical specialties, psychiatry probably has the 
broadest and most complex interface with social and cultural issues. 
One reason is that in psychiatry the “object” of treatment and research 
indeed is not only an object in a quantitative-empirical sense, but the 
mentally ill person as a whole. Therefore, inevitably, all dimensions 
of personhood are involved: biological, psycho(patho)logical, social, 
and spiritual levels are covered by the binding mandate society 
awards to psychiatry. This mandate, however, is not a straightforward 
one. Indeed, it contains complex and even contradictory conceptual 
layers that may well question psychiatry’s identity.
The following examples shall further elucidate this:
– Given its particular “object” mentioned above, psychiatry 
has to accept that philosophical, anthropological, and also 
political issues will necessarily leave their marks in its own 
realm: cultural imprints on psychiatric nosology, mind–body 
problem, competing perspectives of natural sciences and 
humanities in research, and, last but not the least, the risk of 
political abuse of psychiatry, to mention a few.
– Our field has always seen controversial debates on whether 
or not psychiatry should accept a significant role in public 
policy, especially regarding decisions about compulsory 
hospitalization or treatment. In Switzerland, for example, the 
head physician of a psychiatric institution is entitled by law 
to order a compulsory treatment under certain conditions 
(involuntary admission, power of judgement lacking due to a 
mental disorder, no less invasive alternative available).6 Some 
argue that such a massive restriction of human rights should 
without exception be ordered by a judge, not a physician. Others 
doubt that a mandatory and time-consuming involvement of a 
juridical person will be favorable for the patient, since only the 
psychiatrist is skilled to quickly and substantially decide about 
the best option in an emergency situation. Of course, there is 
no simple answer to this dilemma. However, any professional 
person, who takes part in the diagnosis and treatment of 
psychiatric patients, has to seriously look into this subject.
– Society’s attitude toward psychiatry tends to be ambivalent: 
It commissions psychiatry to deal with people behaving in a 
peculiar way or reporting distressing subjective experiences like 
a severely depressive affect, delusional ideas, or hallucinations. 
The same society, however, often displays a skeptical, if not 
distrustful, stance on psychiatry, being influenced by negative 
(and stigmatizing) stereotypes about  mental disorders. This 
tension necessarily affects people who work in psychiatry—
and their professional identity.
Personhood and Interpersonal Relations 
as Conceptual Constituents of Psychiatry
At present, as shown above, the ethical debate on autonomy 
places considerable emphasis on the interpersonal domain, e.g., 
in care ethics or narrative ethics. This is remarkably parallel to the 
conceptual history of psychiatric thinking: Initially drawing on 
postulates of eighteenth century enlightenment, psychiatry ever 
6Art. 434 Swiss Civil Code (“Treatment without consent”)
since debated the role of personal autonomy and its conjunction 
with the interpersonal realm. For Immanuel Kant, the subject’s 
personal freedom necessarily depended on the acceptance of 
other subjects as equally autonomous7. His philosophical system, 
being highly abstract and confined to transcendental idealism, 
as it was, did not exert sustained influence on psychiatry (21). 
However, interpersonal processes as relevant factors in each 
psychiatric therapy did become an acknowledged object of 
debate and research up to the present time.
For Karl Jaspers, psychiatric diagnosis and therapy were 
not just the application of certain techniques, but distinctively 
imbedded into an interpersonal relationship (5). The American 
psychiatrist Harry Stuck Sullivan (1892–1949) placed this idea 
in the very center of his “Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry” 
(published posthumously in 1953) (13). The Austrian Jewish 
philosopher Martin Buber (1878–1965) and the American 
psychologist Carl Rogers (1902–1987) who developed “client-
centered therapy” (22) met in 1957 for a—later famous—dialogue 
about interpersonal relations (23). Recently, the expanding field 
of social neuroscience became influential for psychiatry by 
combining neuroscientific laboratory methods with empirical 
data about the social (and this also means: the interpersonal) 
dimension of probands or patients (24).
Modern approaches in clinical medicine to strengthen patient 
autonomy are manifold, e.g., shared decision making (25), 
empowerment (26), assisted autonomy (27) (instead of substituted 
autonomy)8, advance care planning (28, 29), advance directives 
(30), and ethical guidelines for compulsory interventions (31, 
32). It is no coincidence that most of them reach well beyond 
the plain dichotomy between patient and psychiatrist discussed 
earlier, but emphasize the vigor of the interpersonal dimension.
In summary, the issue of interpersonal relations, although 
discussed controversely, is one of the hallmarks of psychiatry 
and its professional identity. Compulsory interventions, again, 
present a constant challenge: Without an enduring process of 
critical reflection, psychiatry will not be in the position to tackle 
this problem adequately, i.e., to stick to the fine line between 
overt paternalism and pseudo-liberal negligence.
CONCLUDING ReMARKs
Psychiatry is a practical medical field. Therefore, in line with Karl 
Jaspers’ position in the quotation above, philosophical considerations 
in psychiatry will only be of value if they create a more profound 
understanding of diagnostic and therapeutic processes. They cannot 
reduce the clinician’s burden, but—in the best case—they will make 
his or her decisions clearer and more substantial.
This leads to four main conclusions:
– Compulsory interventions severely restrict constitutional 
rights of the patients. Under no circumstances may they be 
7Even more this is true for Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) who further 
developed Kantian principles and defined the interpersonal realm as one of the 
cornerstones of his philosophical system (21).
8To assist and not to substitute autonomy, wherever possible, is a central postulate 
of the United Nations’ “Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities” (3). 
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regarded as undisputed “regular” constituents of psychiatric 
work. They are exceptional measures only to be considered 
under strict and clearly defined ethical and juridical conditions.
– Compulsory interventions confront mental health professionals 
with difficult and not seldom provocative questions that challenge 
their individual professional identity as well as the identity of 
psychiatry in general. Since there is no “autonomy light,” these 
debates are demanding endeavors. They have to be integral parts 
of psychiatry and cannot be fully delegated to external experts or 
institutions, e.g., ethical councils.
– Guidelines about compulsory interventions and their prevention 
are highly useful. However, they alone cannot resolve the ethical 
dilemma brought forward by every single case. Clinicians must 
stay aware of their indispensable responsibilities.
– The debate about autonomy in psychiatry will serve as an 
effective and credible point of contact with society, since 
autonomy also is a central topic in social and political contexts. 
This common interest may stimulate dialogues and, in the 
best case, help to fight discrimination of psychiatric patients, 
professionals, and the field itself.
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